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 International Human Rights Standards and
 the Constitutional Jurisprudence
 of Transition States in Central and Eastern Europe
 by Pal Sonnevend*
 Law becomes reality when it is applied. Whether this happens depends to a large
 extent on whether the judiciary is able and ready to enforce legal norms. It is therefore
 highly important to examine judicial practice when addressing the international influ
 ences on national constitutional law in states in transition. One of the most important
 aspects of this question is the reception of international human rights standards in the
 jurisprudence of constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe.
 Constitutions in the region are quite friendly toward international law. They usually
 provide for the domestic application of international treaties as long as such treaties
 are duly ratified and promulgated into the national legal order. Moreover, most con
 stitutions in Central and Eastern Europe give precedence to international treaty law
 over competing national norms. Some constitutions do it in a general way, like the
 Bulgarian Constitution, which provides in Article 5 that international treaties take
 precedence over conflicting national legislation. Other constitutions limit the suprem
 acy of international treaties to those previously approved by parliament. Examples of
 this are Poland and Hungary. Finally, there are constitutions?like those of the Czech
 Republic and Slovakia?that provide for the supremacy of international agreements
 in protecting fundamental rights and freedoms.
 Procedural rules can also create the possibility of reviewing domestic statutes on the
 basis of international treaties. Examples occur in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland,
 Slovakia, and Hungary. But even in those countries where there is no explicit compe
 tence for such review, as in Russia, the constitutional courts may reach the same result
 through interpretation.
 In view of this normative background it is inevitable that international human rights
 standards play a major role in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts in the region.
 Interestingly, however, it is rather exceptional for these courts to direcdy apply inter
 national instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
 (ICCPR)1 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) .2 And even where
 direct reference is made to one of these instruments, this alone usually does not deter
 mine the matter.
 On the other hand, international human rights standards do come into play in inter
 preting national constitutional rights. Some courts draw inspiration from the ICCPR
 or the ECHR on the basis of specific constitutional provisions. Article 20 of the Roman
 ian Constitution, for instance, provides that the human rights guarantees of the consti
 tution shall be construed and applied in accordance with the Universal Declaration on
 Human Rights, with the international human rights covenants, and with other treaties
 to which Romania is a party. On this basis, the Romanian Constitutional Court, in decid
 ing whether to criminalize homosexual conduct, ruled that the Romanian Constitution
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Eotvds-Lorant-University, Budapest; Legal Adviser in the Office of the
 President of Hungary.
 1 Internadonal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978);
 99 UNTS 171 (entered into forceV^x. 23, 1976).
 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov.
 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force Sept. 3,1953).
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 must be interpreted not only in conformity with the ECHR but also with the interpre
 tation of the ECHR by ECHR organs.3
 Many constitutional courts use international law as a means of constitutional inter
 pretation without having been given an explicit power to do so. Examples include
 courts in the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The
 Supreme Court of Estonia has spelled out clearly the considerations that lie behind
 this approach: "In a democratic state, both the drafting of legislation and the imple
 mentation of laws, including their interpretation, are to be guided by the constitution
 and by historically established general principles of law. In forming and developing
 general principles of Estonian law, principles shaped by the Council of Europe and
 institutions of the European Union must be taken into consideration alongside the
 Estonian Constitution."4
 It is possible to point to a vast number of examples where constitutional courts in the
 region extensively apply international human rights standards. Such a survey would
 reflect the considerable influence of international law. One has to appreciate it if, for
 example, the Russian Constitutional Court abrogates a provision of the Russian Code
 of Criminal Procedure on the basis of Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR.5 Equally, one can
 only express respect for the Ukrainian Constitutional Court for its courageous step in
 declaring capital punishment unconstitutional, relying on a comprehensive inter
 national and comparative law survey.6
 One should not, however, ignore the problems that accompany the reception of
 international human rights standards. These problems appear to be deeply rooted and
 systemic. The application of human rights treaties does not always reflect a proper
 understanding of how far these treaty guarantees actually extend. In fact, courts often
 attribute more to a human rights treaty than it actually guarantees. If, for instance, the
 Slovenian Constitutional Court uses the International Covenant on Economic, Social
 and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to abrogate tax laws that do not respect the subsistence
 minimum of taxpayers, it is probably going beyond of what the ICESCR actually pro
 vides.7 Similarly, the Polish Constitutional Court relied in 1997 on the Convention on
 the Rights of the Child (CRC) to declare abortion laws unconstitutional;8 it would
 seem that the CRC does not under all circumstances lead to such a result.
 Moreover, constitutional courts in the region are not always consistent in relying on
 the case law of the ECHR and ICCPR. They tend to refer to treaty articles or decisions
 of the Strasbourg forums if it fits their purposes. And it sometimes seems that some
 constitutional courts use the jurisprudence of the ECHR organs to derogate from higher
 standards of domestic constitutional law. In 2000 the Hungarian Constitutional Court
 addressed the question of whether national symbols may be accorded specific criminal
 law protection.9 Having in its earlierjurisprudence been inspired by the U.S. Supreme
 Court, the court had until then applied the "clear and present danger" test to criminal
 3 Romanian Constitutional Court decision of July 15,1994, available at <http://www.ccr.ro>.
 4 Estonian Supreme Court decision of September 30,1994, available at <http://www.nc.ee>.
 5 Russian Constitutional Court decision No. 11-P of June 27, 2000, available at <http://ks.rfnet.ru>.
 6 Ukranian Constitutional Court decision of December 29, 1999, in VlSNYK Konstitutsiynogo Sudu
 ukrainy (The Bulletin ofthe Constitutional Court of Ukraine) No. 1/2000 (2000).
 7 Slovenian Constitutional Court decision of November 14,1996, in Official Gazette ofthe Republic
 of Slovenia, No. 68/96 (1996).
 8 Polish Constitutional Court decision of May 27, 1997, available at <http://www.hIi.org.pl/pl/
 orzecz/CONSTCOURT.html>.
 9 Hungarian Constitutional Court decision No. 143/2000. (V. 12) AB of May 12, 2000, available at
 <http://www.mkab.hu/belso/mm031.htm>.
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 laws that restricted freedom of expression. In its recent decision on criminal law pro
 tection of national symbols, however, the court did not see it fit to apply that test any
 more. It referred instead to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
 (European Court) in Rekvenyi v. Hungary, in which the court gave special allowance to
 the specific historical circumstances in limiting fundamental rights in a transition state
 like Hungary.10
 These are some of the difficulties that accompany the reception of international
 human rights standards: There are deficiencies in disciplined and coherent legal
 thinking. Basic rules of how to handle the jurisprudence of international bodies like
 the European Court are sometimes unknown or ignored. Moreover, knowledge of the
 relevant international law is often incomplete or missing. Thus, the numerous refer
 ences to different international instruments and to pronouncements of the European
 Court do not necessarily mean that basic human rights standards are being applied
 properly.
 Panel Discussion
 Thomas Franck (New York University) suggested that too stark a line had been
 drawn between democratic constitutionalism and its tendency towards localism, on the
 one hand, and republican constitutionalism with its tendency towards removing from
 the area of democratic discourse certain issues, on the other. The real task would be
 how in 2002 to induce a demos that determines for itself the extent to which it is
 willing to delegate control over certain aspects of human life to some transnational
 system. In Europe today, the European Union seemed sufficiendy attractive to the
 states of Europe, particularly the newly emerging states of Eastern Europe. That would
 not work with the United States. It might even be true today, if the United States were
 being asked to join the United Nations. Thus, the external counterweights by which
 a demos determines for itself that it wants to surrender certain aspects of democratic
 politics in order to have some guarantee for certain rights, protected by the U.S.
 Supreme Court, protected by the International Court ofjustice or protected by the
 experts of Venice, would not work for the United States. The real question would be
 whether there are benefits to the United States of placing beyond the demos a ques
 tion like the death penalty in the same way that the United States places beyond the
 demos a property penalty. Marco Sassoni (University of Quebec) expressed skepticism
 over whether European constitutional standards could be defined. Simon Chesterman
 (International Peace Academy) pointed to the tension within UN-administered terri
 tories, especially Kosovo and East Timor, which consists in the concentration of ali
 legal powers within a special representative of the secretary general, who is then
 entrusted with the values of democracies in society.
 Responding to Thomas Franck, Giorgio Malinverni referred to the Swiss experience
 with the European Convention of Human Rights and the attitude of Swiss judges with
 respect to unconstitutional cantonal laws that were accepted by referendum. Respond
 ing to Marco Sassoni he acknowledged that the European constitutional heritage is not
 always precisely and easily identifiable but that certain general principles could be
 refined by taking into account the particular situation of the country concerned.
 Jed Rubenfeld responded to Thomas Franck by suggesting that the republican alter
 native of placing questions outside the reach of the demos could be viewed in two dif
 ferent ways. For the European international conception of constitutionalism, it would
 10 Rekvenyi v. Hungary, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R., available at <http://www.echr.coe.int>.
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